The structure and scope of constitutional rights
Stephen Gardbaum * T he titl e and subj ect of thi s c hapter is the structure and scope of constituti onal ri ghts. Because th is is not (yet) a genera ll y o r w idely recognized sub-fi e ld of comparative constitutional law, it i\ qu ite possibl e th at so me reade rs w ill find themselves scratching their heads wo ndering wha t ex actl y these words refer to. Indeed , the very terrn 'the stru cture of constitutional ri ghts' mig ht appea r to be something of a co ntrad icti on fo r, as the organi zati on and table of contents or thi s volume we il illu strate, issues of ' constitutional structure' (Part III) are generall y underloo d tobe d istinct a nd se parate from issues of ' indi vidual ri ghts' (Part lV). The former cover suc h matte rs of in stituti o nal and inter-instituti o nal design as separation of powers, federa li sm and jud ic ial revie w, w he reas the latter concern the direct constituti onal relati onship between the state and the ind ividual. Even if, in Mad isonian vein , we ack now ledge that traditional i s~u es o f con stitutiona l structure have impo rtant effects on this relationship, such as limiting the co nce ntration of pol iti ca l power, these effects are indirect and distinct from the impact of righ ts.
So let me beg in by doing what probably no other contributo r to thi s book will need to do: ex plain the c hapte r title . The stru cture of constituti onal ri ghts may usefull y be distingui shed l'ro m their s ubstance. T he latter concern s the content and parameters of particu lar ri ghts that ex ist in a g ive n constitutional system . By contrast, the structure is the underl ying fram ework -\et o f co nce pts, princ ipl es, doctrines and in stitutions -that appli es to, organi zes and charac terizes constitutio nal ri ghts analys is as a w hole w ithin that system (Gardbaum , 2008) . Spec ifi call y, thi s c hapte r w ill disc uss the fo ll ow ing th ree majo r comparati ve structural issues conce rnin g ri g hts. F irst, is there a comm o n genera l concepti on both o f a constituti onal ri ght -what you have in virtue of having a ri g ht (Kumm , 2007 ) -and o f limi ts o n those ri ghts a111 o ng contemporary syste ms of constitutiona l law? Second , what is the com parati ve scope or constitutional ri ghts? W hat types of law are govern ed by and subordinated to constituti onal righ ts, a nd w hi c h governme ntal and no n-governmental actors do they bind? Third , how and to what e xtent do conte mpo rary constituti onal systems recogni ze positive constituti onal rights of vario us types as weil as negati ve o nes?
A ltho ug h each o f these three issues has been separately acknowledged and add ressed to a greate r o r lesse r degree in practice ancl scholarship , their commo naJity and connectedness as forrn in g a di stinct sub-fi e le! of constitutional rights jurisprudence has generally not. As a ;, ubj ec t, the corn parative structure of constitutional ri ghts, of course, looks at these issues co mparat ively: to what extent do d ifferent constituti onal systems converge o n o r share a simila r o r common fram e work fo r analyzing and adjudicating ri ghts, whatever may be the individu al dille re nces in conte nt. T hi s c hapte r w ill conc lude with a plea fo r recognizing the topic a\ a d islincl s ub-fi eld w ithin comparati ve constitutional ri ghts jurisprudence.
CONCEPTIONS OF CONSTlTUTIONAL RIG HTS AND T HE IR LIMITS
For practi cal (il . not necessaril y for phil osophi ca l) purposcs, thc do minant genera l co nceprion of a constituti ona l ri ght among contcmporary co11 stit.uti o11 al systcms aro und the worl d -what an indi vidual has by virtue o f being a bl e to cl a im protecti o n 01 · a constituti o nal ri g ht -is an irnportant prima fac ie legal claim again sr (rn ostl y) govern111 ent infrin gern ent that can, noncthe lcss. bL' lirni ted or overridden by cerra in conlli cting pub li c po li cy objecti vcs . At least as it app lies in thc Unitecl States, thi s general concepti o n has becn referred to as constituti o nal rights as ' shidd < (Schauer, 1993) in contrast to the peremptory or absolute concepti on o f consri tuti ona l ri ghh <1' 'trurnps' . lt also contrasts, althoug h less starkly, w ith a thircl conception of constituti onal rigl fö as specifying exclusionary reasons for government acti on (Pi !des, 1994 (Pi !des, , 1998 .
W ithin thi s general conception, the weig ht o f the presumpti on in fa vor of the consri1uti o11<1l ri ghts claim varies somewhat frorn country to coun try and fro rn ri ght to ri ght. lt is so rn et i lll ö claimed, for exa mple , th at the Unitecl States has a mo re 'categori cal ' concepti on of ri ght~ in thi s sense, not because ri ghts are necessaril y trumps but becau se of a g rearer ge neral presumpti ve weight in fa vo r o f a constituti onal ri ght (K urnm ancl Ferreres Co me ll a, 2005 ) Thi s claim has, however, not gone undi sputecl (Garclbaum , 2008) .
Thi s general conce pti on o f a constitu tio nal ri ght is typi call y operationa li zed ancl adju d icated through a two-ste p process. T he first ste p determines w hether a constitu rional righ t i' impli catecl ancl has been infringecl ; that is, w hether the prim a fac ie claim has been establi~h e d . The second step cletermines whether the infrin ge ment is no nethe less a justifi ed one; that i:; . whether the government has rebuttecl thi s prim a fac ie case by sati sfyin g th e co nst iluli onal criteri a for Jimiting or overricling the ri ght. Thi s First ste p concern s the definiti o n and scopcthe interpretation -of a constituti o nal ri ght; by contrast, the seconcl s te p in volves consickri11g the strength ancl relevance o f the government's confli cting publi c po li cy obj ecti ve .
These two near-uni versal s te ps of constituti o na l ri ghts anal ys is respecti vely e m p loy [\\\) different types of limi ts on con stitutional ri ghts : intern al and ex ternal limits . Interna] li mih on rights concern the definitional scope of a con slituti onal ri ght and are part of the firs t-stc p process of cletermining w hether a constituti o nal ri ght is impli catecl in a given siruarion in thc first place. Thu s, for example, does the co nstituti o nal ri ght to liberty, autono m y or free ck w lopment of personality include the freedo m to choose an abo rti o n ? Does freedo m of e xµr ösion include the ri ght to ex pend money on po liti cal campai gns, to e ngage in ' h ate speech · m de fam e publi c or pri vate indi vidual s? Extcrnal limits, by contrast, are constituri ona ll y perrni;,sibl e restricti ons on ri ghts that are impli catecl and clo appl y in a g iven situ ati on . Th at is. the\ are part of the second -step process of spec i fying the c ircurn stances in w hi c h the gove rnrn clll can pursue a publi c poli cy objecti ve even th oug h do ing so confli cts w ith ancl in fr in ge~ :1 corfstituti onal ri ght. So, fo r exampl e, w he re th e constituti o nal ri ght to libe rty, autono rn y l1r free developme nt of personality is inte rpretecl to inc lude the ri ght to c hoose abonion. rhc' ex ternal limit issue is w hen, if eve r, may co nfli cting publi c po li cy objecti ves asserred by thc government limit or o verride that ri g ht? lf freedo m o f ex press io n is interpretecl to incl mk 'hate speech ', w hen, if ever, may the government limi t o r override that ri g ht 10 pro1cc t it;, victim s (Gardbaum , 2007 ) '1 Although const ituti onal scho lars ha ve ge nerall y v iewecl these two typcs of limi ts as 1rnnuall y exclu sive conceptu ali zati ons and de bated thc ir rcspccti ve merits -the intcrnal vcr' u ' Th e structure and scope of constitution.al rights 389 ex tern a l thcory of Jimits ( A lexy, 2002) , definiti onal versus ad hoc ba lancing (Nimmer, 1968; Butler, 2002) the actual pract ice of co nstituti onal ri ghts jurisprudence tends not to treat them as a ltern at ives by choos ing one or the other but to employ both , to a greater or lesser degree, onc in each o f the two ste ps of ana lysis.
lt is so met imes c laimed that, excepti onall y, the Un itcd States engages onl y in the First step of constitutional ri ghts ana lys is and not the second; that is, courts in the United States treat constitutio nal ri g hts c laims cxc lu sive ly -or almost exclusively -as issues of definition and scope and not a lso as iss ues of ba lanc ing ri g hts aga inst conflicting publi c po licy objectives (see th e South Afri can Constituti onal Court cleci sion in S v Makwan yane ( 1995), at 435; Kumm and Ferreres Corn e l la, 2005) . T hi s claim is a second and distinct version of the ' more categorical' conception of ri ghts c laim that we saw above and is made in !arge part because, unu sua ll y by comparativc sta ndards, the US Const ituti on contai ns very few express limits o f either type on the const ituti onal rights it proc laims, but particularly few -if any -ex press extemal limits. Agai n, thi s c laim has not gone undisputed , on the basis that such limits have long been judiciall y impli ed in the United States (B utl er, 2002; Webber, 2003; Gardbaum , 2007 Gardbaum , , 2008 D ixon, 2009 ) .
As just suggestecl, both types of limits -intern a l and ex tern al -may be express or implied. A rti c le 9(2) of the Germa n Basic Law provides an example of an express interna l limit on the ri ght to freedom of assoc iation: ' Assoc iations whose purpose or acti vities conflict with criminal statutes o r that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of internati onal understandin g are prohibited '. Articl e 13(2) o f the Bas ic Law is an example of an express external limit (here on the right to inviolability of the home) : ' [ntrusions and restri cti ons [on the right] may otherwi se lthan specified in Article 13(2) ] be made on ly to avert a pub lic danger or a mortal clanger to individual s, o r, pursuant to statute, to prevent substantial danger lo pub li c safety and order, in particular to reli eve a hou sing shortage, to combat the danger of ep idemi cs or to protectjuveni les who are ex posed to a moral danger. ' The First Amendment to the US Constitution is an example of a constitution al ri ght wi th both impli ecl intern al and externa l limits. Tlrns, ne ither w hat types of expression lie outside the ri gh t to 'free speech ' in the first place nor the c ircum stances if any in whi ch the government may justifiabl y limi t what is within the ri ght are ex pressed in the text, but the US Supreme Court has implied both. So it has ge nerall y he ld ( 1) that obscenity, 'fi ghting words' and expressions that amount to 'c lear and present danger of imminent hann ' are not protected at all and (2) that protected ·rree speech' may be restri ctecl w here necessrn·y for a compelling government interest.
Ex press cxternal limits are of two types: e ither a single general statement o f the extern al lirnits that ap pl y to all constituti onal ri ghts (a general limitations clause) or different custom ized ex tern a l limi ts that attach to specific ri gbts, as in the exampl e of A rticle 13(2) of the Basic Law above. Secti o n 1 of the Canadian C harter of Rights and Freedoms contains a we ll-know n genera l li mitation s clause that states: 'The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom s g uarantees the ri ght s and freedom s set out in it subject onl y to such reasonabl e limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic soc iety'.
Section 36( 1) o f the South Afri can Constituli on contain s the follow ing general limi tations cla use :
T hc r ights in th e Bi ll of Ri ghts may be li mitcd onl y in tenn s of law of general applicat ion to the ex tent that th e limitati on is rcasonable anti justifiabl e in an open and democrati c society based on hu man dignit y, equalit y ancl freeclom , taking into account all relev ant factors, inclucling -the nat ure or the ri ght ; th t: irnpon ancc: or tht: pu rpose of the li m i tati o n; thc naw rc: and cx tent o r thc lim itatio n; thc: rclati on bc:twt:t:n th c limi ta ti on and th c purposc; less rcstri cti ve rn eans to achi cvt: th c purp o~t: .
Thc seco nd ste p o f constituti o na l ri g ht s an a lys is a nd adjudi c ati o n is ty pi ca ll y a nd innc';1'ing ly o perat iona li zed by a pp li cati o n or the prin c ipl e o r p roporti o nalit y . Hav ing its o rigin ' in Germa n admini strati ve law, thc proporti o na li ty prin c ipl c bcga n to be a p p li cd by rh c Fcdcr<il Constituti o nal Court (FCC) a f'ew yea rs a l't c r it ca m c into bc in g, in thc lat e l 950s. <lll d 11 :1' spread over the succeeding decades at rap id specd to man y countri cs a nti com titutirnd rcgim es aro und the wo rld , inc ludin g Canada, Israel, South A fri ca , m o st Eu ropean co u1nric'' and the Euro pean Co nve nti o n o n Hu man Ri g hts (Stone Sweet a nd M a thcws, 2008 ).
The proportio na li ty princ ip le is now he re ex press ly cont a in ed o r ret'erenccd in thc tcxt tl l' :1 co nstituti on -secti o n 36 o f the So uth A f'ri ca n Constituti o n and sccti o n 8 or ls racl' s ß;i-; i,· Law : Hum an D ig nity and Libc rty com e the c losest -but has been impli cd by couns :1' th(· prope r meth odo logy fo r app ly in g tex tu a l limit a ti o n s c la uses . S tri c tl y spcak ing, the pn)porti o nality princ iple de te rmi nes w he the r th e means e rnp loyed b y the governme n t to prom ot e it' conllicting publi c po li cy obj ecti ve a re ju stil'i e d but -ar least w he re thcy are not s pccil'ic'd in re levant limitati o ns c lause (as , for ex amp le , in A rti c le 13(2) o f the Basic La w quoted ab n\ c 1 most countri es a lso app ly a prior or threshold test to thi s obj ecti ve it sel f. T h at is. thc ju,tifi c ati o n of a ri ghts lirnitati o n unde r seco nd-ste p anal ys is ty pi c a ll y in vo lves bo th mc:11 1' :rn cl e nds require me nts . Thu s, unde r its fa m o us O o kes test, thc S upre rn e Court of Canad a ( SCC' first asks w hethe r the governrne nt o bj ecti ve in questi o n is ' of s uffi c ie nt impo rt ance 10 warr:rnt overriding a con stituti o na ll y prote cted ri g ht o r freedo m ' and that 'it is necessary. a t a 111i 11imum , that a n o bj ecti ve re late to co ncern s w hi c h are press ing and substantial in a 1 ·rCL' :l!ll 1 de mocratic soc iety be fore it can be c haracte ri zed a s suffi c ie ntl y irn portan t ' .
The propo rti o na lity princ ipl e is ope ra tio na li zed throug h a c ornmo n threc-pro ng 1cq: t 1 that the mean s used are suita bl e o r ra ti o na ll y re late d to thi s o bj ecti ve: (2) th at they arc nccc->sary or minimall y impair the ri g ht; and (3) that the m e an s used are pro po rti o nale : tha t i:-.. th c'' clo not impose di s propo rti o nale burden s on the ri g ht re lative to the obj ec ti ve . Thi s l<ht prtlll:;'. is ofte n referred to as ' propo rti o nality slric t o se11s u', and re quires balanc ing thc rcL1ti h· weig ht o f the ri g ht and thc li mitati o n in th c parti c u lar c irc umsta nces (A lcxy. 2002) . In thi' way, eve n th o ug h thi s sarn e ve rbal test a pp li es to lirnitati o ns or all constituti o na l r ig h h \\ it hi1 a sy ste m , it does no t necessaril y in vo lvc a s in g lc pres umpti o n o r pres um p ti ve weigh l a11 :1ch in g to a ll ri g hts equall y a s the third pron g rnu y take into account the re lati ve i111portancc P I differe nt co nstituti o na l ri g hts .
A ltho ug h thi s thrce-p ro ng conte nt o f th e propo rti o na lity lest is fa irl y uni form . thc rc < Ire' .1: least two va riatio ns in how it is appli e d by courts in diffe re nt countri cs . T hc fi rst is th;1t thc' co urts o f certa in countri es , suc h as Ca nada and G e rman y, e mplo y a morc t'o rmal izc d \'L'r'i ,111 in wh ich the three pron gs o f the test are c on s ide re d scparatc ly and in o rd c r; o nl y il' thc p1·c\ i ou s prong is sati s fi ed does the court mo ve on to thc nex t. By co ntrn st. th e So uth ,L \ l'rican C on stituti o na l Court (SACC) and the Euro pea n C ou rt o t' Huma n Ri g ht s (ECt l-IH. ) tcn d !1• e mploy a rn o re gesta lt, o r a ll -thin gs-con s ide re d , vers ion w itho ut brea king down thc tc:-.t int its cornpo ne nt parts . The seco nd va riation is tha t the prac ti cc o t' sevcral co m mon Lm c u u1~ tri es in parti cular refl ects a certain une ase w ith the th ird pron g, so m e time s by trcnti ng th' nccessi ty/m ini mal impa irmen t as the fin al stage of proporti onali ty rev iew, by fo rmall y omitting it from slatements of the lest, by con fl ati ng it with the necessity test or by ra rely rely ing on il in pract ice (R ivers, 2006) .
As is we il know n, the U nited S tates does not employ the pro portionali ty test fo r its seco ndste p analys is o f cleterminin g whether limits o n constituti onal ri ghts are justifi ecl . Rather, it cmp loys the doctrin al fr amework of fi xcd tiers o f rev iew in whi ch each ri ght is protectecl by one of a hancl ful of differe nt stanclards o f rev iew -strict scrutiny, inte rmecliate scru tin y, rational basis scrutin y, un due bu rden s tanclarcl -imposing greater or Jesser burclens of justification on the govern ment. lt is widely acknow leclged, however, that thi s second-step methodo logy still req uires US courts to ' ba lance' ri ghts again st co nflictin g government interests; indeed, the so-ca ll ecl ' anti -ba lanc in g criti q ue' is far fro m limited to countries ap pl ying the proporti onali ty pri ncip le (Habermas , 1996) , but is well represen ted in US scho larl y and judicial writings ( A le inikoff, 1987; Pil cles , 1994; Rubenfeld, 2001 ; Scali a J " e .g. Crcrnford v Washing ton , 2004) . Although it is thus uncontested that the U nited States empl oys neither the labe! nor the prcc ise contc nt o f the proporti onality test in constitutional ri ghts acljuclication, severa l scho lars have arguecl that the cli fferences between the two seconcl-step methoclologies are far s ma ll er and less significant than often ass umed or c laimecl (Jackson, 1999; Beatty, 2004; Law , 2005 ; Fa ll o n, 2007) and, more genera ll y, do not justify -along with other cl aimed differences me nti oned above -ascribing to it an exceptional conceptuali zati on o f constitutiona l ri ghts <Garcl baum , 2007 , 2008) .
As part o f a sub-fi eld of comparati ve constitutional law that largely doesn' t yet ex ist, it is not surprising to fi nd that the scho larshi p in this area is sporadic rather than comprehensive. Two areas in parti cul ar seem to be worthy of more attention in the fu ture. First, the focus of study shoulcl ex pand beyond the core group o f coun tries most commonl y discussecl and comparecl, not 'iO much to di scover different concepti ons o f ri ghts but a wider range of appli cations in practice. Second , with a few recent exceptions (ßeatty , 2004; Kumm , 2007; Gardbaum, 2007 Gardbaum, , 2010 Tsakyrakis, 2009 ; Webber, 2009 ), there is a relati ve absence of normati ve scholarship on proportiona lity ancl constitutional balancing, despite a large and growing literature on the conceptual ( Alexy, 2002; Fall on, 1993 ), doctrinal (Erniliou, 1996 , hi stori cal (Porat and Cohen-Eli ya, 20 10) ancl positi ve dimensions (Stone Sweet and Mathews, 2008) of the topic.
THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: VERTICAL AND HO RI ZONTAL EFFECT
A seco nd funda me ntal stru ctural issue concerning constituti onal rights is their scope of application. O nce we know w ho thc subjects -or benefi ciaries -of constitutional ri ghts are in any given jurisdictio n (typica ll y e ither all ci ti zens or all persons within it), an equall y important but far more co rnpl ex question ari ses about their obj ects: who ancl what is burdenecl or co nstrained by co nstituti o nal ri ghts? W hi ch indi viduals and what types of Jaw do they bind ?
In parti c ul ar, w hat is the ir reach into the ' pri vate' sphere? W ithin comparati ve constitutional law th is issue is genera ll y know n under the rubri c of 'vertical' and ' hori zontal effect'. These alternatives standardly refer to w hether consti tutio nal ri ghts regulate onl y the conduct of govcrnmental actors in the ir clealin gs with pri vate individuals (vertical) or also relations arno ng pri vate ind ividual s (hori zontal). l ·I I• T he trad itio na l animating idca in form ing Lhe vcrtica l approach is the perceived de,; ira bility of a pub li c-pri vate divi s io n in thc scope of consli tutional ri g hl s, leav ing c iv il society and th e priva te sphere free from the unifo rm ancl co mpul sory rcg imc of constitutional reg u lat ion. T he we ll -know n j ustifi cation s fü r thi s d ivis ion li e in th e va lues o r li be rty, a uto nomy, p ri vacy a ncl market e ffi c ie ncy . A consti tuti o n' s most c ri t ica 1 a nd cl ist i nc ti ve fun c ti on , acco rd i ng w thi s genera l view, is to provicle law ro r the law mak e r not fo r the c iti zcn, the reby f' i ll ing w ha 1 would otherw ise be a serio us gap in thc rul c of law (Kay, 1993).
The a rgu me nts for adopting the oppos ite, hori zonta l approach express an almost cq u1 li l) wcll -known c ritique of thc ' libera l' venica l pos it io n. Fi rst, to thc ex te nt the f'un c tion 01 · 11 constituti o n is seen as express ing a soci e ty 's mos l fund a me nta l ancl im portant va lues . th c: shou ld be unclerstood to app ly to all its me mbe rs. Second , at least in the contempo r11r: contex t, constitutio nal rights and va lues may be threatcned at least as much by ex1re 111c l: powerful private acto rs and in stituti o ns as by governme nta l o nes, and the vertical approac h auto matica lly pri vil eges the autono my a nd pri vacy of suc h c itize n-threateners over lhosc of the ir v ictim s. In thi s way, the a ulonom y o f racists, sex ists am! hale-speakers is c ategori call y pre ferred to that of those harmecl o r ex clucled by the ir acti o ns, w ithoul any obv io us j us tifi c11ti o n in tc rm s of an overa ll assess me nt of ne t g ain s a ncl losses in autonomy. Moreover. sin cc the vertica l position cloes not ipso fac lo prevent private actors from be ing regu lated by nonconstitutiona l law, it is unclear w hy autonomy is especially o r di stinctively thre atencd b: constitutio nal regul ation (Chemerinsky, 1985; Fiss, 1986 ).
T he ana lytica l ancl practical compl ex it y of the genera l iss ue of the scope of cons titut i<'ll 'li ri ghts is, however, beli ed by thi s see ming ly stra ig htforwarcl and s impl e b ifurcat ion be lwec n vertical ancl horizontal effect. For, as on ly a li ttle scratc hing beneath the surface soon rcvcal~. the Fact that unde r the verti cal approac h (whe re it app lies) pri vate incliviclual s are not boun d by constitutional ri ghts in no w ay e nta ils tha t constituti o nal ri g hts clo not govern rhe ir legal re lat io ns w ith one another ( Horow itz, 1955) , ancl the re by de te rmine w ha t they ca n law fulh be authori zecl to clo and whi c h of their inte rests, c ho ices and acti o ns m ay be protec ted by la\\ . Rathe r, thc tracl itional vertical position me re ly fo rec loses the most direct way in w h ich ~1 constituti o n mi g ht regulate pri vate incli vidua ls, by impos in g constitutiona l clut ies o n thc rn (Garcl baum , 2003) .
Accorclin g ly, in orcler to attai n a ri c he r unde rstancling of the scope of constituti o na l right' in any g iven system and to apprcc iatc the ra ngc of answers that ex ist in practice, it is nccc ,sary to supple ment the most bas ic question of vertica l o r ho ri zo nta l e ffecl (a re indivi clu ab ~1' weil as governmenta l actors bound by constitutional ri ght s?) w ith the fo ll ow in g th rce add itional o nes. First, even w ith res pect to governme nta l actors, do constitul io na l ri g ht s bind all such acto rs o r o nl y some; and , if o nly some, w hi c h 'l Jn parli c ul a r, clo they bind the leg isla turL' and the courts? Second , do constituti o na l ri g hts appl y to private law (and , in comn1 on l:l\\ juri sdi ct ion s, to common law) as we il as pub lic law? T hird , do constituti ona l rig ht s apply tP li tigat ion between private incli vidu a ls 'I There is a fa irl y w icle a rray o r a nswers to these sup p lc mc ntary ques ti on s in prac ti cc , \1·it h the conseq ue nce that the broade r question of horizontal e ffcct -thc impact of const itu t ion :li rig hts o n pri vate indi v iclu a ls -is not a s impl e yes or no issuc but rathe r a matte r o r dcgrl'C. Evcn w ith respect to the bas ic q uesti o n, those countri es tha t ado pt the d irect ho rizon tal po,; ition by subj ecting private indi viclu a ls to constituti o na l ri g hts do so to diffe ring degrec,; aml in differe nt way s. So, for ex ampl e, in Ire land , the 'constituti o na l tort acti o n' has bcen i111 plicd by the courts fro m a gene ral tex tual duty o n the state to protect ancl c nfo rce the ri gh ts 01· imli -vid uals. By contrast, in South A fri ca, w hi ch has been a maj or foc us of scho larl y attention as an important case stud y in hori zonta l effect, direct hori zontality is the express, if pm·tial and comp lex , mandate o f sections 8(2), 8(3) and 9(4) of the constituti on (M ichelman, 2008). 1 Even thou gh both the Germ an Bas ic Law and the Canadi an C harter have been determined not to impose constituti ona l dut ies o n pri vate ind ividuals, in answer to the first supplementa ry questi on the SCC has he ld that C harter Rights do not bind the coun tries ' courts (because section 32, the applicat io n clause, refers onl y to legislatures and ·government', with the latter mean ing the executive branch o nl y). 2 By contrast, the FCC has held that the ri ghts in the Basic Law do bind the courts; indeed , the vast maj ority of successful constituti onal compl aints in Germany are aga in st the lower courts. Under the statutory bill s of ri ghts enacted in the United Kin gdom and both the Australi an Capital Territory and state o f Victori a, the ri ghts are ex press ly stated not to bind the legislature , so as to maintain the essenti al co re of parli amentary sovereignty -although the one enacted in New Zealand does -and in the United Kingdom and New Zealand , but not in the two Australian bill s of ri ghts, the rights also bind th e courts .
O n the seco nd supple mentary question , the iss ue of whether private law (and espec iall y the C ivil Code) is subject to the Basic Law and its consti tuti onal ri ghts in Germany was the cause of a major and prolonged debate before the FCC fi xed its position in the landmark and infl uential Lüth clec ision o f 1958. 3 T he commo n law was held to be subj ect to C harter ri ghts by the SCC in the case of Dolphin Deli very but, as we w ill see shortl y, not as fully or equall y as private statute law. ln South Africa , the common law is subject to both ' direct' (under section 8) and ' inclirect' (under section 39) applicati on of the Bill of Rights (M iche lman, 2008) . Both Australi an jurisdi ctions have exclucled the common law from be ing subject to their statuto ry bi ll s o f ri ghts, and this issue has not yet been definiti vely resolved in the UK.
Finall y, on the thircl questi o n, because the C harter appli es neither to private indivicluals nor to the Co urts, the sec also he ld in Dolphi11 De/i very that Charter ri ghts do not apply to co mmon law liti gation between pri vate incli vicl uals where the onl y official acti on is a court order. 4 By contrast, the major argument in the United Kingclom that the Human Rights Act does appl y to such 1 itigation ste ms from the inc lu sio n of the courts among the ' public authorities' bound to act cons istently with Conventi on ri ghts. Jn South Afri ca, the Bill of Ri ghts can ap ply directly to such suits, altho ugh it can also appl y indirectl y -by developing the comrnon law in line w ith its 'spirit, purport and obj ects' (M ichelman, 2008) . Aga in , these d ifferent answers to the suppl e mentary questions refl ect d ifferent degrees of horizontali ty o r practical burden of constitutio nal rights on pri vate indi viduals even among cou ntri es that share the basic vertical position o f impos ing constitutional ri ghts dut ies onl y on governmental actors . Some o f the typi cal legal areas in which these practi cal burdens play out are de famat io n, in vasion of privacy suits and e mployer-empl oyee law.
The issue o f horizonta l e ffect has sparked g reat interest among comparative constitutional law scho lars in recent years. T he reasons are, 1 thin k, twofold. First, it has become of enormo us practical i mportance in the wake of the spectacul ar burst of constitution-making that has take n place around the world s ince 1989. Along with such other basic choices concernin g the structure of constituti o nal ri ghts as w hether to incl ude positi ve as weil as negati ve rig hts, constitutio n drafte rs have hacl to dec ide whether, how and to what extent private individuals are to be subj ect to new constituti onal ri ghts prov isions. Seconcl , the very ra nge of situ atio ns w ith whi ch these new constitution s have been designed to clea l -from postaparthe id to post-communi sm -has chall enged and stimu lated scholars to think anew about the nature and functions of constituti o ns. Are they mere ly law for the law make rs or nonrn1tive charters fo r reborn soc ieties'I Hobbes ian soc ia l contrac ts be tween rule rs and rulcd , o r Lockea n o nes a mo ng equal c iti zens? In thi s con text, the issue of hori zo ntal effec l has becn ;1 centra l o ne, provoking fresh co ns ide ratio n of how co nstituti o nal law dille rs fro rn o th e r typö and sources o f law.
O ne of the major cont ributi o ns that co mparati ve constitutional law sc holars ha n:atte mpted to make to these real -wo rld tran sfo rm at io ns has been to clarify the sornev, 1 ha1 comp lex and confu sing co nceptual framework o r the issue o r ho ri zo ntal e ffect a nd to clevcl op a coherent and user-fri endl y me nu o f o ption s so that informed c ho ices can be rnadc . Th i, became necessary because, for the reasons suggestcd above, the o ri g inal and strai ght fo rward bipolar di stinction be tween verti ca l and ho ri zonta l c ffect proved too c rudc to exp lain rhc' different w ay s in whi c h constituti ona l ri g hts ca n have a n impact o n pri vate actors or l t) capture the most com mo n types of c urre nt co nstitutiona l practi ces .
The principal scho larly achi eveme nt in thi s area has bee n the c reati on a nd re fin e rn ent o l" a concept that describes an inte rmed iate third positi on in betwee n the polar positi ons of venical and ho rizontal e ffect. O ri g in atin g in the FCC's lanclmark Lüth decision, thi s co nce pt i, known in Germa n as ' millelbare Driuwirkung' ancl rn o re gene rally as ' indirect hori zo ntal effect', as cli stinct from the ' direct' ho ri zonta l effect of the seconcl polar pos iti o n. In e ssencc. thi s intermecliate positio n is that altho ug h constituti o nal ri g hts apply clirectly o nl y to th c governme nt, they nonethe less have some degree of indirect a pplicati on to private actob . More precisely, the di stinction betwee n direct a nd indirect ho ri zontal effect is that bdwecn subjecting private actors to constituti onal ri g hts o n the one band (d irect), a nd subj ectin g private laws to constituti o nal ri ghts on the othe r (indi rect) (Gardbaum , 2003; Tu shnet, '.?.Om: Cheadle, 2005) . In o ther words, the re are two diffe re nt ways in w hic h constitutional 1 ·i glm mi ght regul ate private actors, that is, have ho ri zontal effect: ( 1) directl y, by governing rh cir conduct; o r (2) indirectly, by governin g the pri vate laws that structure thei r legal re lat io1h with each other. Thi s second , inclirect method of regul a ti o n limits what pri vate actors 1m1\ ' lawfu ll y be e mpowered to clo and whi ch o f their inte rests, prefere nces ancl actions can bc protected by law.
Thi s di stinction sho uld put to rest a certain lin gering confu sio n in the literature abo ul w ha1 is ' inclirect' in the concept of ind irect ho ri zonta l e ffect. For it is some times assumecl that indirect hori zontal effect requ ires the indirect subjection of private law to consti tutiona1 righh in order to distingui sh thi s position from direct h o rizontal effect. T hi s ass um pti on is incorrcct. W hat is inclirect is the effect o f constituti o nal ri ghts o n pri vate actors. Unlike the clirect dlcct of constitutional ri ghts resulting from the impos iti o n of constituti o nal cluti es in the fu lly horizontal positi o n, indirect hori zontal e ffect is achi eved via the impact o f co nstitutional ri ghb 011 the pri vate law that individual s re ly o n a nd/o r in voke in c ivil di s putes. Now thi s irn pact 011 pri vate law can, in tu rn , be eith e r clirect (where co nstitutional ri g hts a pp ly to it full y. equ ci1\\ ancl specifi call y) o r indirect (whe re courts a re required or e m powered to take co nslit uti o nal values into accoun t in inte rpreting and clevelop ing its provision s) . To cl istin g ui sh th ese tw\1. the fo rme r has been te rmed ' stro ng indirect h o ri zonta l e ffect' a ncl the lattcr ·weak i11 dirce1 ho ri zontal e ffect ' (Phillipso n, 1999 , Gardba um 2003 . ß ut w hi c hever of these tvvo meth oJ, is usecl , it is the indirectness of the effect o n pri vate actors, no t o n private law , that ckl'inö the general positi o n.
ff the re are two ways in w hi c h a constitution mi g ht regul a te pri vate actors -d irec tl y am! indirectly -there is onl y o ne way to e nsure that it w ill no t regulate the m at a ll. that is . h~l\ c'
The st ructure and scope of co11 stitutiona / right. 1· 395 110 horizo nta l c fTcct. T hi s is to limit thc scope o f appli cati on of constitu tional ri ghts to publi c Jaw, th e law rcgul at ing the re la ti ons bctween ind ivicl uals ancl the state. O nce the concept of ind irect hori zonta l e ffect ente rs the picture , it is in suffi cient to characte ri ze verticali ty as s ubj ectin g o nl y governme nt to conslituti onal ri ghts provisions -or as regul ating laws and stale co nduct alone . W hi le thi s characte ri zati on remain s use ful in anchoring and di stingui shi ng lh e po lar hori zontal pos iti on, it does not di stingui sh a trul y vertica l pos ili on from indirect horizon ta l e flect. T hi s is because incl ircct hori zontal effect is quite consistent with this restri ctio non ly governmenl has constitutio na l cl uti es -yet it still permi ts signi ficant impact on pri vate indi viduals by subj ect ing pri vate laws to consti tutional ri ghts scrutin y. For example, Canada and G erm any each generall y adhere to the tracl iti onal verli cal approach that constitutio na l rights b ind on ly the governmen t ancl yet, in both coun tries, such rights have significant (ind irect) impact o n pri vate acto rs. T his trad iti onal approac h to vertica lity, in other word s, rad ica ll y undetermines the lrue scope o f consti tuti onal ri ghts. lt is too blunt -th at is, consistent w ith too many re levantl y d istinct positi ons on the scope o f consti tuti onal ri ghts -to be use l'ul w itho ut furth er re fine rnent. Hence, a better conception of the vertical positi on is one that d istin gui shes it from indirect hori zontal e ffect by not permitting an y hori zontal effect at a ll . T hi s co nception -w hi ch mi ght be termecl 'stron g verti cal effect' -is that the scope o f co nstituti ona l ri ghts is limitecl to publi c law onl y (Gardbaum , 2003; Somrneregger, 2005) .
The net resul t is that the generall y understood spectrum of pos itions has been enlarged to add ind irect ho ri zonta l e ffect as a new third position in between the traditional polar ones. In lin e w ith the suggestion in the prev ious paragraph, it has also been proposed that the spectrum of ge neral pos iti ons can and should be furth er refined so that it is unclerstood in the lo ll ow in g fo urfo ld way : ( 1) no ho ri zontal e ffect at all (strong verticality) , (2) weak indirect horizonta l e ffect, (3) stro ng indirect hori zontal effect and (4) direct hori zontal effect (Gard baum , 2003 (Gard baum , , 2006 . O f course, fo r countri es at the direct hori zontal e nd of the spectrum , these are not necessaril y mutuall y exclu sive cho ices as they typi call y also aclopt some form of in d irect hori zontal effect, as , fo r exa mpl e, in Argentina.
A seco nd strength o f the comparati ve scholarship has been ex pl orati on o f the connections between the stru ctural issue of the scope of constitutional ri ghts and the substanti ve issue of the ir conte nt. O f course, the genera l argument that the structure of constitutional ri ghts shoul d be recogni zecl as a d istinct sub-fi eld cloes not turn on a claim of be ing henneticall y sea led and havin g no in teracti on with subslance; to the cont ra ry, part of its remi t woulcl be to ex pl ore the co nnccti o ns in both directio ns. G iven th at, as we have seen, ind irect hori zontal effect subjects (a ll o r mosl) pri vate law to constituti onal ri ghts scrutiny, in any country adopting thi s pos iti o n -or, o f course, direct ho ri zontal effect -the actual or concrete consequences for pri vate ind ividu a ls turn w ho ll y on the substance of those ri ghts. So, for ex ample, very broad substantive constituti onal equ ality or free speech no rm s (such as incorpora ting di sparate impact or inc idental burdens on s peech) would result in much traditi onal contract, property and tort law be ing unco nstituti onal o r significantl y altered to cohere with constitutional norm s, and so havc g reater impact o n indi vi dual s ; narrower substantive norms (s uch as prohibiting onl y intentiona l government di scri minati on or conte nt-specifi c speech regulation) would not CTushn et, 2003; Garclbaum , 2003) . lncleecl , thi s connecti on has led Tushnet to argue that the thresho ld ' state acti on ' iss ue is conceptu all y equi valent to the issue o f constitutional social and economi c ri ghts : the more extensive a commitment to social and economic ri ghts, the mo rc easil y courl s w ill lower barri ers of scope; the greater the resistance to such substanti ve r·ig hts, thc more co urts w ill empl oy verti cality as a threshold defense technique (Tu shnet, 2003) . S im il arly, sc holars ha ve ex p lo red the su btl e co nnecti o ns be twcen jurisd ic tio nal. i1Nitutio nal and procedu ra l dill e re nces a mo ng ccrtain hi g hest courts -w hethe r they are spec i<1 list co nsti tutio nal o r gene ra list courts, whet he r th ey ha ve juri sdic ti o n to in te rp re t am! app\\ pri vate, co mmo n o r sta te/prn vinc ia l law -a nd the o pe rati o n of indirect ho ri zonta l e ffec l in those co un tries <Tushne t, 2003 ; Kumrn a nd Fcrre res Come ll a, 2005; M ic he l man , 2 00~) .
O ne spec ifi c issue about w hi ch thc re has been a fa ir a mou nt o f d isag reeme nt -or ai ic< hl so mewhat contracl ic to ry unde rsta nd in gs -in compa rati ve co nstituti o na l sc ho larshi p is thc· ac tua l pos itio n o f the United Stares o n ho rizonta l e ffec l. So , o n the o ne ha nd . probabl y thc domina nt vie w is that the US 's we ll -kno w n ' statc ac ti o n doc trine ' resu lt s in it rejecti ng ur limi ting indirect ho ri zo nta l effect and so being close r to th e verti ca l e nd o f the spec trurn th an many other co nte mporary constitu tio na l syste ms, inc lu d ing Germ a ny a nd Ca nada (]-lurn. it has been cla imecl specifi call y that Canad ia n cou rts a nd the co urts of othe r comrno n la1\ cou ntri es have take n a ' more cauti o us ' approach tha11 the US S up re me C ourt o n the issuc· (U itz, 2005; Sau11 cle rs, 2005 ) aml, mo re gene ra ll y, that fa r fro m rej ecti11 g o r lim iting ind ircct ho ri zontal effect, the US ad he res to it in its strong fo rm: that is, a ll la w -includin g pri vate'
law statutes a nd court-made common law at issue in pri vate liti gati o n -is fu ll y, eq uall y < rnd directly subject to co11 stitutio nal ri g hts scru tin y (Gardba um , 2003 (Gardba um , , 2006 .
Despi te thi s recent fl o wering o f inte resting a nd hig h q uality co mparati ve co nsiirur io nal sc ho lars hi p 011 the top ic, w hi ch ofte n co mpare s favo rab ly w ith pure ly do mestic sc holarship in the area, much re m ain s to be clo ne . Pe rhaps the two most irnpo rta nt gaps to be fil kd ~1r '' these. First, almost inev itab ly and li ke muc h o the r work in these still fa irl y ea rl y days or rh c' re vival of the d iscip line as a who le , the sc ho larshi p te nd s to be foc used o n a fai rl y s ma ll c luste r of co untri es -here, mostly Ge rm any, C an ada , the U S a nd So uth A frica. T o so me e x1c111 this is justifi ed because, as w ith the case of the propo rtio nality princ iple discussecl in Sec 1io11 1, the Germ an a pproach has been e no rmous ly influe ntia l and adopted w ith or w irh ou l modifi catio n in ma11 y othe r co untri es. A nd cle velo pme nts in South A fri ca , in thi s rn-ea an cl oth crs . have been im portant in re thinking the fun c ti o ns a ncl poss ibiliti es of constitutio nal Lrn. Nonethe less, 011 thi s to pi c, apart from the sta nda rd o r ge ne ra l concern s of skewed dat a pui nh and re presentati veness, the re is the more spec ific o ne tha t co rnparati ve scho larshi p has mo,;il\ ig no red fasc inating and ori g in al developme nts o n direct ho ri zonta l effect in rece nt years in seve ral Latin A me ri can cou11 tri es -includ ing Co lo mbi a, Argentin a a nd the US t:e rrit o ry t)f Puerto Rico -under the w rits o f 0111paro ancl tute/a (Rivera-Pe rez, fo nhco ming) . I mkcd .
these co un tri es prov ide the best case stud ies o f a pos itio n that has large ly bee n tre are c.l as '1 theo re tical optio n o nl y in the literature . T he seco 11d maj o r ga p is a co m pa rat ive c 111 piric ,i1 assessme nt of the tota l im pac t of consti tuti o na l ri g hts -o r, more li ke ly, o f pa rr ic ul ar on c:--o n pri vate actors res ulting fro m a co mbin a ti o n o f all the re le va nt structural a nd subsiant i\c' issues. T hese are : ( 1) w hi c h pos iti o n o n the re fin ed verti ca l-ho ri zonta l spec trum a cou ntn takes ;
(2) the jurisd ict io n o f its co nstitutio nal c o urt o r co url s; (3) the conte nt o f its con stilllti o nal ri g hts provis io ns; and (4) the ex iste nce o f po sitive constituti o na l ri g hts ( J'o r th e c:· qilanatio n, see the ne xt sectio n) .
NEGATIVE AND POS fTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A thircl impo rta nt to pi c co nce rning the comparative struc ture of co nstit utional rig hts i~ tlll' ----Th e st ru ct11re and scope < Jf" constilu tional rights 397 distinction between negati ve and positi ve constituti onal ri ghts that is manifested and insti tutionali zecl within and a mon g d ifferent contemporary constitutions. Tims, some conta in no or very few positi ve ri g hts, others inc lude both negati ve and positi ve constitu tional ri ghts and :;ome constituti o nal courts give positive inte rpretations to certain seemingly negatively phrased ri ghts but not others.
T he basic co nceptua l di stinction between negative and positive constituti onal ri ghts is we ll -known a nd stra ightforwarcl. Negative constituti onal ri ghts -or what are commonl y Jrnow n as defens ive ri ghts (Ahwehrrechte) in Germany -are ri ghts not to have certain th ings do ne to you , typ ica ll y (but not necessaril y) by the government. ln th is sense, negative constitutiona l ri ghts impose li mits or duti es of fo rbearance on (mostly) government acti on, on w hat governme nts can lawfu ll y clo. T hu s, class ic negati ve ri ghts inclucle the ri ght not to be depri ved of li berty or pri vate property ancl not tobe subject to cru e l or inhumane punishment. By contrast, positive constituti onal ri ghts are ri ghts to certa in states of affairs; tlrnt is, they are constituti ona l entitle ments . T hey impose affi rm ative obli gation s -rather than limits -or duties of action o n (mostly) government actors. C lassic positi ve ri ghts include the ri ght to vote, to protection from viole nce , to education and healthcare. Althoug h, o f course, th is disti nction does concern the content of constitutiona l ri ghts, it also ra ises more general issues that are ap propriate ly tho ught of as stru ctural.
A na lytica ll y, thi s issue of negative and positi ve ri ghts is di stinct from that of hori zonta l effect considerecl in the prev io us secti on because it concern s the nature or type o f the duties that constituti onal rights impose on whomever they bind . Us ua ll y, as we have seen, thi s is onl y government actors (even uncler indirect hori zontal effect), but where and to the extent that constitutional ri g hts al so bi nd private actors, they may , at least in theory, impose affirmative ob li gation s o n them (for exampl e, to protect their neighbors from theft or vio lence) . Despite thi s ana lytical distincti on, in practice positi ve rights are an important source of ind irect horizontal effect. T hi s is because to the ex tent that constitutional ri ghts require government to reg ul ate private actors, private actors are inclirectly affected by and subject to them (Gardbaum , 2003 (Gardbaum , , 2006 . Mark T ushnet has, in addition, arg ued that substantively the two are con nected insofa r as ' the more extensive a nation 's com mitment to soc ial welfare va lues in its legislation, the re adier that natio n's courts will be to utilize an expansive doctrine of state act ion/indirect horizonta l effect. The reason is simpl e. T he state action doctrine is, at bottom, ahout soc ia l and economic ri g hts' (Tushnet, 2003 (Tushnet, , 2008 ; emphasis in orig ina l).
Modem const ituti ons contain two main types of positi ve constitutiona l ri ghts . T he first is soc ial and econo mi c ri ghts -or constitutional welfare ri ghts -as, for example, the ri ghts to ed ucation, hea lthcare, housing, minirnum standard of li v ing and work. The second is proteclive ri ghts: constituti onal ri ghts to protection or security from the state against certain types o f ac tion by fe ll ow-c iti zens, such as violence ancl theft. Constitutions rnay and do contain ( 1) both types of positive ri ghts, (2) o ne type but not the other or (3) ne ithe r. Thi s distinction betwee n the two rnain types of pos iti ve ri ghts serves as a reminder that not all positi ve ri ghts are social and econo mi c in nature and also that the converse is true: not all social and cco nomic ri ghts are pos itive ri ghts . For exampl e, such significant social and economi c ri ghts as the ri g ht to c hoose an occupati on and the ri ght to ed ucate one' s child pri vately -where recogn ized in a cons titution -may (but need not) be exclus ively negat ive in scope, requiring only governmental forbearan ce from prohibiting business entry and banning pri vate schools. These ex am pl es also make c lea r that the positi ve or negati ve nature of a constitutiona l ri ght ca nnot automati ca ll y be inferred from its general fo rmul ati on as a ri ght 'to' or ' not tobe'.
T he re are ma ny ex a m plcs o r positi ve soc ia l a ncl eco no 111i c ri g hts in m ode rn co nst ituti o1h. a lth o ug h the numbe r a nd ex te lll o f s uc h ri g hts va ri es c no rm o us ly fro m regio n ro region anti a lso fro m co un try to co untry . Both thi s fac l and lhe gap in lrul y co mprehe ns ivc comparrn iw scho la rs hip o n th c iss uc 111 ake gc ne rali za li o ns pc ril o us ancl , o rte n, over-broad . Non c rh e k s~. two c an be stated w ith a hi g h deg rec o r co nJ'icle nce. First, as ·seco nd gene ra ti o n · righh . constituti o nal soc ial a nd cconom ic ri g hts arc prim a ril y the produ ct o r o ne o r the two gre~l! modern bursts o r co nstilllli o n-m ak ing, the first a rt e r 1945 and the second a C te r 101'9. Acco rding ly, the ex iste nce o f a t le ast ex press co ns tituli o nal welfa re ri g hts is hi g h ly corrda ted with constituti o ns w ritte n (o r a me nded ) d uring o ne o f th ese pe ri od s. The 1947 Ilali a n aml th c 1996 South A fri c a n consti tuli o ns a re perh a ps pa radi g ma li c in thi s regard . SeconcL aml no tw ithsrandin g thi s First po in t, overall th e c o nstituti o ns o f the new ly libe rated c oun tri cs 01 central a nd e aste rn E uro pe and So uth A fri ca , as we il as o the r develo ping and fo rrne rl y coloni zecl na ti o ns, mo re c o ns iste ntl y co nta in s ig nifi cant numbe rs o f socia l ancl eco nom ic 1·i ght' than other countri es , in c luclin g th ose in Weste rn Europe (G arclba um , 2008) . The mo'1 co mmo n exa mpl es o f pos iti ve soc ia l a nd econo mi c constituti o nal ri ghts are the rig hh lll publi c educati o n, to hea lthcare a nd to soc ia l sec urity .
W here as w he re g ranted , pos iti ve soc ia l and economi c ri g hts a re ty picall y express]\ conta ined in a constituti o na l tex t, co nstituti o na l ri g hts to protecti o n are a li tt le more ewn h di vided between text ancl judic ia l impli cati o n. So, for exa mpl e, the c on stituti o ns ol" Smnh Afri ca, G reece, Sw itzerl and a nd lre land contain express ri g hts to state protecti o n . 5 E l sew h c1"<.~. protecti ve duti es have been impli ed by the judic iary from certain textu a l ri g hr s that seem ,111 th e ir fa ce negati ve. Tim s, th e bes t-kn ow n a ncl m o s t impo rtant protec ti ve du riö (Sc hutzpflichten ) in Genn a ny concern the ri g ht to life ancl freed o m of express io n . T he FCC fam o usly inte rpreted the form e r in the First A bo rti o n Case to require th e sta te to protect thc' Ji ves o f fetu ses again st suc h pri vate acto rs as the ir mo the rs, presumptively th roug h the c ri1nin al law. 6 The ri g ht to freeclo m of broadcasting w as also inte rpre te d by th e F CC to rcq uirc' state regul ati o n to e nsure the protection o f c iti zens' access to the full ran ge of po liti ca l opinions necessary for the m to make informe d dec isions at e lection s. 7 Altho ug h acl mi uecl ly :in inte rnati onal co urt, the ECtHR has been parti c ul a rl y active in in fe rrin g pro tec ti ve du ri e~ fr rnn the seeming ly negati vely phrasecl civil and po liti cal ri g hts containecl in the Europc'<lil Co nventi o n. In a seri es o f c ases, it has ruled that bo th the ri g ht not tobe subj ect L o 'inh um~1 11 o r clegradin g treatm e nt ' uncl er Articl e 3 and the ' ri g ht to respect for . . . pr ivate ancl fmn ily lik. uncl er Arti c le 8 require states to enac t la ws e ffec ti ve ly protectin g c hil d re n l"ro m sex ual aml other ph ys ica l abu se by aclults . lt has a lso he lcl that freed o m o f assembl y under A n ick 11 requires pos iti ve ac ti o n, inc luding e ffec ti ve po li ce protecti o n, to e nsure the ri g ht may be ö Crc ised. 8 Unlike the case gene rall y w ith negati ve constituti o na l ri g hts, the practi c al irn pacl 01 · both ty pes o f pos iti ve co nstituti o nal ri g hts is som e times s ig nifi ca ntl y redu cecl e ithe r by exprö' stateme nts in the constituti o n that so me o r a ll s uc h ri g hts are no tjudi c iall y e nfo rceabk m b' jud ic ia l prac ti ce to s imilar effect. S tarling w ith soc ial ancl economi c ri gh rs, the const itu 1io11' o f Ire la nd , lnclia and Spain (in the latte r case, a part fro m the ri g ht to edu cati o n) exp rc:-;, l\ di sting ui sh between ri g hts prope r aml ' directi ve ' or ·g uidin g princ ipl es ' of soc ial and econo mi c po li cy that a re inte ncled to g uide the leg is lature but arc not cogni zabl e by a ny cuun S imil arl y, apart fro rn the ri g hts to primary ecluc ation aml to 'a id in di stress· , thc S\\ i~' Constituti o n c ontain s a set o f 'soc ia l goal s' that is ex press ly dec larecl to be no n-j usti ciabk The Nethe rlands Constituti o n dec lares that ' l.iJt sha ll be the concern o f rh e autho r itit:< t 1 • 1 promote o r secure certain social and economic goa /s, such as 'sufficient empl oy ment', ' the health of the po pul at io n ' and ' suffi cie nt li ving accommodati o n', but it specifi ca ll y gran ts 'rights' onl y to a ' free c hoice of work' a nd to ' aid fro m the authoriti es fo r those unable to prov ide fo r th e mselves ' . Moreover, Article l 20 of the constitutio n expressly denies D utc h courts th e power o fjudi c ial rev iew at all , which prevents these two ri ghts fro m being e nfo rced aga in st the leg islature .
Even whe re judic iall y e nfo rceabl e, constituti o nal courts have generall y been cautio us about the scope of the ir rcv iew of soc ial and econo mi c ri ghts and have tended to gran t legislat ures wide discreti o n as to the means o ffulfillin g their affirm ati ve obli gati on. Accordingly, a reasonabl e ness test h as been the no rm . In South Afri ca, thi s reasonableness standard -relative to availab le resources -is actuall y conta ined in the te xt as definin g the positive obli gations of the state w ith respect to most o f its soc ial and econo mi c ri ghts, and th e constitu tio nal Co urt has as a res ul t rej ected the pro positi o n that such ri ghts entitl e indi vidu als to be provided with 'a minimum core' . As is weil know n, howe ver, in the important cases o f G rootboorn and Treotm.ent Action Carnpa ign, the SACC held that government policies in the areas of ho using fo r the desperately need y and combating mother-to-child transmi ssion o f HIV were un reasona bl e and thu s unconstitutio nal. Moreover, in the latter case, the SACC ordered the governme nt to c hange its restri cti ve po licy o n access to the dru g Nev ira pine . Both the Japanese a nd Ko rean supre me courts have subjected textual ri ghts to minimum li ving sta nda rds to hi ghl y cle fe re ntial reasonable ness tests under whi ch government programs were uphelcl, altho ugh bo th ack nowledged that governme nt failure to act at all to promote the consti tuti o nal objective woulcl amo unt to an un constitutio nal abuse of di screti on. The ltali an Con sti tuti onal Court has also gene ra ll y in te rpreted the many social and economic ri ghts containecl in the 1947 Constitutio n as impos ing a reasonable ness test on governme nt poli cy in the relev an t areas (Ll o re nte, 1998) . T hese differences have lecl Tushnet to classify social and econo mi c ri g hts into three ty pes : ( J) me re ly clec laratory; (2) weak substanti ve ri ghts and (3 ) stro ng substanti ve ri g hts (Tushn et, 2008) .
Sirnil a rl y, the leve l of jud ic ial scrutin y to whi ch constituti onal ri ght s to protecti on are subj ect is ty pi call y lower -mo re clefere nti al -than th at affo rded to negati ve rights w ithin the same co nstituti o n . Accordingly, protective ri ghts gene rall y gran t to governme nts greate r disc ret io n in doing w hat the y mu st do than negati ve ones grant in what they cannot. As we saw in Secti o n 1, consti tutio nal ri g hts are typi ca ll y protected by a propo rti o nali ty test unde r whi c h the inte nsity of sc rutin y vari es, among othe r things, with th e importance of the ri ght in questi o n. Even the re lati ve ly less impo rtant ri ghts, tho ugh, m·e subject to the second, minirnal impa inn e nt pro ng th at provides additi onal protecti on above am! beyond th e fi rs t, rationality prong . Protecti ve ri ghts, however, are generall y subj ect o nl y to a fo rm o f reasonableness test, rathe r than the usual propo rti onality test. That is, courts typi call y ask o nl y wheth er the state has reasonab ly fulfill ecl its pos iti ve duty, a usuall y leni ent and deferential test that rarely resul ts in findin gs o f failure . T he reasons for thi s mo re le nie nt test are the Standard reasons fo r wariness a bo ut inclu d ing pos iti ve ri ghts in constituti o ns th at we w ill bri efl y ca nvass in the nex t subsecti on : that in te lling th e elected branc hes o f government what they mu st do, the j udic iary lacks instituti o nal ex pe rtise a nd assumes control of the publi c purse. I n Germ any, th e FCC has no t he ld th at the government violatecl its protecti ve du ty w ith respect to the ri ght to 1 i fe and health in a ny case o ther tha n the two concerning abo rti on (Neu man, 1995) .
A pa rt fro m descripti ve work on parti cul ar countries, and he re South A fri ca and the fo rme r Sov ie t-bloc nati o ns h ave been the maj o r subjects, more general o r structu ra l scholarshi p on negat ive and pos iti ve co nstituti o na l ri g hts has mostly focu sed on the followin g two i~) Llt> First, certa in scho lars ha ve ca ll ed in to questi o n the conceptual di stinc tion be tween nega1i1l' and pos iti ve ri g hts, and othe rs, w hi le accept in g th c di stin ctio n in theory, h ave arg uecl Lhat th c· clille re nce betwee n the rn in pract ice is fa r s ma ll e r than assum ed . Second , there has bcen :1 robust dc bate o n w he the r constituti o ns s ho uld co ntain pos iti ve ri ghts and to w ha t e xtern. i1 a ny, soc io-econo mi c ri ghts g uaran tees in pa rti c ula r m akc muc h differe nce in 1 xac1icc . ,-\ third , perhaps s lig htl y mo rc paroc hi a l, iss ue a nd o ne that is gene rall y less th e o ccas ion 1·ur arg ume nt than assumpti o n is the fo ll ow in g : how di stinc tive is th e U nited S tates Cons1i1u1iun on thi s top ic'I A ltho ug h not thc first to do so, Cass S un s te in has cast do ubt on the gene ra l d istin clt llil between negative a nd pos itive constitution a l ri g hts by a rg uing ( 1) that ' m ost of the so-ca lkd negati ve rig hts require gove rnme nt ass istance, not governrne ntal abstin e nce ', g iv in g till' exampl es o f th e c reation ancl dependence of private prope rty , freedorn of contrac t and c rirninal procedure rights o n law and co urts, and (2) that 'la III constituti o nal ri ghts land not 0111 :positi ve o nes j have budgetary imp lication s; all constituti onal ri ghts cost mone y ' (Sun st ci n. 2005 ). To the e xtent thi s is inte nded as a n argument about the conceptual rather than th e p1:k'ti cal diffe re nce between the two, 1 think Sunste in succeeds in showing that it is poss ib k fl1r prope rty and contrac t ri g hts to ma nd ate governrne ntal ass istance as a matter of co11sri n11io11ul lo wby, for exarnp le, requirin g the state to c reate a nd protect property and e nforcc co 11 1rac1' again st pri vate infringements; that is, the ri g ht to a syste rn of pri vate prope rty -but l ' rn ll ll! sure he show s that it is inhe re nt o r necessa ry . A pure ly negati ve constitutionaJ ri g hr to pro pe rty is s ure ly conceiva b le and mi g ht include o nl y a ri g ht against governmem taki n g~ ,11 pri vate prope rty (whe re it ex ists) w ithout just compen sation o r governrne nt de pri va ri on ,11 pro perty w itho ut due process, and freedorn of contract on ly aga in st arbitrary gove r11111c111 regulati o n. That is, the re are or may be di stinc t negati ve a nd positi ve constitution::il ri gh l' concerning property and contract. W hethe r or not the United States or any othe r cornH 1 ·; k 1' such ex te nsive constitutional (as di stinct frorn leg is lati ve o r comrnon law) ri ghts 10 propc rt\ and contract as to incorporate the pos iti ve s iele, the bas ic conceptua l dis tinct io n be\\\ Cl' l' negative and pos iti ve constituti o nal ri g hts appears to survive the cha ll e nge (Gardbau1n. 2008) .
Th is debate, o f course , overlaps w ith the one in the inte rn atio na l hu ma n rights a1·c' 11:. co ncernin g the concept of the 'ge neratio ns ' of ri g hts, which includes -bu t is cert a i11ly nPt lirni ted to -the issue o f w hether there is a valid di stinction or inhe re nt difference be twc·cn tllc' so-call ed ' first gene ration ' of hum an ri g hts (c iv il and po li tica l ri ghts) a ncl the ' second gc11c' I" ati o n ' (econoJ11i c, soc ial a nd c ultural ri g hts) (A lston , 2001 ; Da intith , 2004) .
M o re spec ifi ca ll y o n practical diffe re nces between negati ve ancl pos iti ve rig hts. D:11 id Curri e pointecl out that the e ffect of co mm o n genera l constituti o nal a nti -d iscrim in ation p1'l1' isio ns, such as the US's equal protecti o n c lau se, is to c reate 'concliti o na l affirmative' d uti ö c 1 I pro tecti o n and provis ion of governme nt services. ' IIl f governJ11 e nt. unde rtakes to hc lp r\ . 11 may have to he lp B as we il. ' Moreover, g iven the prac ti ca l imposs ibili ty o f a bamlo ni ll',certain protecti ve laws (s uc h as the c rirnin a li zati on o f murde r ancl th eft) and gove rn111 c' lll welfa re prog ram s, the e ffe ct o f suc h anti-di sc riminati o n provi s io ns w ill often be thc sank' :t' if the re were an a bso lute affirmative co nstitution al d uty to e nact the la ws or prog rarn ( Uffic' . 1986) . C urri e's point ex plain s, for exa mpl e , w hy in the Un ited States, even absent a cun~ti tuti o na l dut y to protect the ri g ht to life of a f e tu s as ex ists in Gerrna ny, a finclin g tha t :1 kt u' is a 'pe rson ' for const ituti o na l purposes would probab ly e nta il in prac ti ce tha t the st< ll c rn u,1 protect its life along with the other persons it chooses to protect. Failure to do so would Ji kely amount to unconstituti onal di scrimin ation.
A second area that has attractecl a good deal of scholarly attention is the iss ue of whether o r not co nstitutions in general -and parti cularl y the new constitutions of countri es seek ing to make the transition from centrali zecl to market econorni es in central and eastern Europe _ shou ld inc lude soc ial and economic ri ghts . Most o f the argurnents , for and against, have foc used on pragmatic or instrumental concerns rather than theoretica l, moral or intrinsic ones. Arguments against such rights include that they either become meaningless promi ses and there by threaten to unclermine negative ri ghts and the rul e of law or are ruinously ex pensive fo r poorer countri es (Saj6, 1996) , and that they unclul y interfere with the attempt to create rna rket econo rnies ancl hobbl e the creation of civil society (Sunstein , 1993) . More generall y, it has been arg ued that pragmatic understanding o f the Operati on of government ancl particularly the judicial systern clooms any hopes that the recogniti o n of positive ri ghts will improve the Ji ves of the intended beneficiaries (Cross, 2001 ) . One argument fo r such ri ghts is that court dec ision s on social ri ghts ca n bolster elected politicians' abi li ty to stand up to internatio nal fin ancial instituti ons preaching 'market fundamenta lism' and thereby enhance publi c support for de mocracy (Scheppe le, 2004) . Another is that fai lure to inclucle such ri ghts would be viewed by the peopl e as an attempt by the ruling eli te to depri ve citizens of their acquired rights and fatal ly uncl ermine popular support for the new regime (Os iatynski , 1996) .
W hether ancl how pos iti ve ri ghts in general ancl social ancl economic ri ghts in particul ar are justi c iabl e and enforceable has always been a major part of thi s issue (Craven, 1999; Scheinin , 200 1 ) . Two clevelopments in the pas t decacle have enri checl thi s aspect of the scholarly clebate. First, the fact that the SACC first dec la recl the fina l constituti on's soc ial and eco nom ic ri ghts tobe judicia ll y enforceable ancl then the rn anner in which it enforced two of them in the Grootboo111 and Treatm ent Action Cwnpaign cases menti onecl above had a s ubstantia l impact on th is issue, even persuacl ing some acaclemi c co mmentators to pa rt ia ll y cha nge their mind s (S unstein , 200 1 ). It has also prov iclecl fresh ev idence and in sights on the questions of whether ancl ho w social and economi c constituti onal ri ghts make any rea l di ffe rence to the li ves of the poor (Dav is, 2008). Seconcl, the recent estab li shment ancl growth of what has variously been termed 'weak-form judicial rev iew' (Tushnet, 2002) ancl ' the new Co mmonwealth mode l o f constituti onali sm' (Garclbaum, 2001) has proviclecl a new form o f juclicial rev iew -in which the leg islature has the lega l power of the final worcl -that may be particu larl y appropriate fo r social ancl economi c ri ghts (Tushnet, 2004; Dixon, 2007 ) .
A third issue is the di stinctiveness of the Un ited States on thi s issue. Is it distinctive, to what extent and in w hat precise regarcl? And if so, what is the ex planati on? The starting point is the observati on, encapsul atecl in a well -know n phrase from a lower court opi nion, that the US Constituti on is a 'c harter of negati ve rather than positi ve li berties' . And the common irnpli ca ti on is that thi s makes the United States excepti onal by contemporary stanclarcls. T lrn s, it has occas ionall y been argued -but more often simpl y statecl or assumecl -that the US Conslitution is hi ghly excepti onal in not creatin g any social ancl econorni c ri ghts (S unstein , 2005) . A lthough undoubtedl y refl ecting the broad scholarl y consensus within comparati ve constitutional law , thi s cl aim about the extent or clegree of US excepti onalism has not, howeve r, go ne entirely unchall enged. Gardbaum has arguecl that (1) US constitutional culture cannot be assessecl onl y from the fecleral perspective because many state constitutions in the Uni ted States contain some social and economi c ri ghts; (2) fe w other common la w juri sclictio ns contain soc ial and econo mi c ri ghts in their constituti ons or bills of ri ghts; ancl (3) even a mong contin e nta l West Europcan cons litu tion s, the ex te nt to w hi c h they corn a in s uch rig hl'· can and is e as il y exaggerated. In s ho rt , th c US is no t un iqu e o n thi s issue a ncl , es pecial ly w hc'll comparcd to its ·peer' g rou p o l' deve lo pcd co untri es, not rea lly th at di stinc ti ve. Pe r hap s llllh' irnpo rtantl y, the ex tc nt a nd cx iste nce o l' modern wclfare states do not a ppe ar to be co 1Tci~1lc' C in a ny obv io us way to the p rcscncc, absence o r scope of co nstituti o nal soc ia l and eco norn ic· ri g hts. Well'arc states a re overw hc lmin g ly the produc ts of o rdinary le g is lmi ve proc<:>-o;,> rathe r than constituti o na l ma ndates . Evcn w ith rcspcct to protecti ve dut ies, he a rg ues that lhc US is less excc pti o na l tha n o fte n rh o ug ht (Ga rdbaurn , 2008) .
Regard less o r how di stinc ti vc its pos iti o n rea ll y is, the Standard ex planati on s for the absclll' c' of constituti o na l socia l and econo mi c ri g hts in the Unitcd States are the age o f it s co 11 sti ll1l io11 . the re lati ve di ffi c ul ty o f a mending it, the trad itio na l fo c us o n 'hard ', judic iall y e nl'o rceabk righ t' and broadcr po liti cal/cultural exceptiona li s m that includes the near-unique absence of a s trong sociali st moveme nl. S un ste in has recentl y show n the limi ta ti o ns of these convent ional exp la11:1ti o ns ancl proposed a more plau s ible and o ri g in al ·rea li st' one, foc us ing on the corn ingcnc' u1 preside nti a l e lecti o n results and conseque nt judic ia l no minatio ns at the c riti cal mo me ms wh c· ;1 US courts mj g ht o the rw ise have done what was done e lsew here and re inte rpre te d exi sti1 1g constituti ona l provisions to include soc ia l and econo mic ri g hts (Sunste in , 2005) .
In te rm s o f gaps o r weaknesses in the scho larl y lite rature in thi s area, the rn ajor o nc i, perhaps the in s uffic ie nt amount o f trul y comparati ve wo rk o n positive ri g hts -as cbt inc'l fro m ( 1) e ithe r mo re abstract or heav il y contextu a li zed arg ume nts for and again st recog11i1in g the m , and (2) a foc us o n spec ifi c indi vidu a l ri g hts o r countri es . Fortu nate ly , 01· cour'L ' . there are excepti o ns (e .g. Daintith , 2004) . B ut in the gene ral abse nce of s uc h wo rk. thi' tc mb tobe an are a in w hi c h ass um ptio ns ancl overge ne ra lizatio ns are too ofte n re pe ate d ra rh er 1h:111 a na lyzed o r questio ned.
CONCLUSION
T he fact that thi s c hapte r has d isc ussecl three impo rlan t, genenll struc tural iss ues conccrn ing co nstitutional ri g hts w ith o nl y ve ry lirnited re fe re nce to the ir substance o r conre nt illustr~l! c'' that the two to pi cs are -thou g h hardl y e ntire ly unconnecte d -di stinc t, and strong ly su ggc''l' they s hould be recogni zecl as formin g a unifie d ancl separate sub-fi e ld w ithin co111rarati' c' constituti o na l ri g hts juri sprucle nce. For one th in g, th is w ill pe rrnit rn o re foc used stud y 0 11 1k in te ractio ns be tween the two .
Anothe r reason is the s heer impo rta nce o f constituti o nal ri g ht s in mo de rn co nstilln ion;ilisrn . Of co urse, it is possible to have both constituti o na li sm w itho ut a codi fied co 11 , till1titH1 and a co nstitutio n w itho ut hav in g co nstituti o nal ri g hts -as the o ri g inal boc.l y o l' thc L"' .' -.
Constitution and th e ex istin g Australi a n Constituti o n mostl y illu strate . Howeve l'. prolc'cl iti n of fund a me nta l o r human ri g hts has been the central driv in g fo rce beh in d th e rrel11L'lldt 1 ll ' g rowth o f constituti o nali sm a nd judic ia l rev iew around the wo rl d s in ce the e nd o f W orld \\ ,1.-IJ , so that the g reate r ana lyti ca l a nd sc ho larl y too ls th at would com e fro 111 sub-di\·id in; co mparati ve constitutiona l ri g hts juri sprude nce into its two compo ne nts of structurc :rnu co nte nt wo uld appear to be a promi sing pros pect.
As part of thi s g reate r re fin e me nt, it w ill a lso e ncourage ( 1) examin ation of rh e C'\ lClll tc' whi c h structura l pos iti o ns operate as a xio mati c, founclationa l o r thresho ld princ ipk s sh ap i11~ a nd co nstrain in g the substance o f ri g ht s and (2) incle pe nde nt cons iclera ti o n of tll e e x tc11 1 '''
